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THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE AS
APPLIED AGAINST CHILDREN IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
The question of children's contributory negligence has been
considered in the Indiana courts many times in the past century.'
The question generally arises when a tort action for damages is
brought for a child's injuries or wrongful death. If the defendant in
such an action alleges that the child was partly at fault, the question
of the child's contribution to his own harm becomes a critical issue.2
In Indiana, contributory negligence is considered an affirmative
defense and the burden of proving the defense is on the defendant.'
The general statement of the defense is that although the defendant
has violated a duty, has been negligent, and would otherwise be
liable, the plaintiff is denied recovery because his own unreasonable
conduct was a contributing legal cause to the harm he has suffered.4
1. See, e.g., Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Bottorff v.
South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 222, 110 N.E. 977 (1916); Lanoux v. Hagar, 159 Ind. App.
646, 308 N.E.2d 873 (1974); Indianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115 Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d
586 (1945); Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co. v. Croly, 54 Ind. App. 566, 96 N.E.
973 (1911).
2. There are a limited number of cases that deal with the primary
negligence of children. However, it is outside the scope of this note to determine
whether the principles Indiana applies to children's contributory negligence also apply
to children's primary negligence. The Restatement (Second) of Torts treats the
primary and contributory negligence of children in a similar manner. Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, comment a & b (1965), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 464, comment e (1965). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS, 157-60 (3d ed. 1964) (hereinafter cited as PROSSER).
3. Schmidt v. Liesenfet, 379 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1967): Memorial Hosp. of
South Bend v. Scott, 261 Ind. 27, 300 N.E.2d 50 (1973). Though Indiana now considers
contributory negligence to be an affirmative defense with the burden of proof and
pleading on the defendant, this is not the only way to approach the issue. Some
jurisdictions require that the plaintiff plead and prove due care. E.g., West Chicago St.
R.R. v. Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N.E. 367 (1900). In fact, Indiana, prior to 1943, re-
quired the plaintiff to plead and prove that he was without negligence. See Heiny v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 221 Ind. 367, 47 N.E.2d 145 (1943); See also Note, Pleading of Con-
tributory Negligence in Indiana, 23 IND. L.J. 511 (1948). This view has some merit
since the contributory fault of the plaintiff can be considered a defect in plaintiff's
cause of action. Thus, to require the plaintiff to plead a cause of action free from defect
is not totally unreasonable.
4. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, con-
tributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own protection." Memorial Hosp. of South
Bend v. Scott, 261 Ind. 27, 36-37 300 N.E.2d 50, 56 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 463 (1965).
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In essence, proof that the plaintiff unreasonably contributed to his
own injury bars him from recovery regardless of the negligence of
the defendant. 5 The defense operates as a penalty on the plaintiff
and, in states such as Indiana, which refuse to recognize com-
parative negligence, it operates as an absolute bar to recovery.'
There has been a general consensus among Indiana jurists
throughout the state's history that the immaturity of the child plain-
tiff should be given special consideration whenever contributory
negligence is alleged.7 It has always been agreed that some effort
should be made to limit the use of the defense against the young
who are not yet fully capable of protecting themselves against the
dangers of the world.8 There has been considerable disagreement,
however, over exactly how the immaturity of a child plaintiff should
be taken into account. Also, there has been disagreement over ex-
actly what steps the courts should take to limit the defendant's use
of the defense against immature and sometimes helpless children.'
As a result of such disagreements, Indiana has been unable to
completely and consistently follow any one method of dealing with
children charged with contributory negligence. Consequently, Indiana
currently applies a unique combination of two major approaches to
the children's contributory negligence problems in use throughout
the nation today." These two approaches are known as the
5. Memorial Hosp. of South Bend v. Scott, 261 Ind. 27, 300 N.E.2d 50 (1973);
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 427.
6. Booher v. Alhom, Inc., 156 Ind. App. 192, 198, 295 N.E.2d 841, 849 (1973);
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 427.
7. "The cases . . . all recognize the rule that children of tender years are not
to be treated as persons of mature years." Indianapolis, P. & C. R.R. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind.
179, 180, 6 N.E. 310, 312 (1886). Every Indiana case cited throughout this note that
deals with the children's contributory negligence issue either explicitly or implicitly
supports the textual and quoted material. See note 21 infra.
8. An early case that acknowledged that the contributory negligence defense
should not be applied against children as it would be against adults was Louisville, N.
A. & C. Ry. v. Sears, 11 Ind. App. 654, 38 N.E. 837 (1895). The court stated that
children are not to be treated as adults when charged with contributory negligence.
9. Two Indiana Supreme Court cases illustrate these disagreements. An
early case, Bottorff v. South Const. Co. represented the view that the courts should
only look at the age of the child to determine whether he has the capacity to be con-
tributorily negligent. 184 Ind. 222, 110 N.E. 977 (1916). A more recent case, Bixenman
v. Hall, represented the view that the education, judgment, and intelligence of the
child should be considered along with age. 251 Ind. 522, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968). These
two cases represent the two different points of view that have found support at
various times in Indiana history.
10. See notes 165-202 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of current
Indiana law.
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Massachusetts method" and the Illinois method." This note ex-
amines the Indiana cases that deal with the problem of children's
contributory negligence. The more recent decisions favoring the
Massachusetts method are compared to those at the turn of the cen-
tury when the Illinois method was favored.'3
The comparison reveals that Indiana has basically abandoned
the arbitrary but administratively expedient Illinois approach for
the more flexible and accomodating Massachusetts method." The
comparison reveals, however, that one portion of the Illinois ap-
proach has not yet been abandoned. The unabandoned portion of the
Illinois approach deals specifically with children below age seven
and still must be considered today when dealing with the issue of
children's contributory negligence. '5
Though policy considerations are stressed, 6 this note mainly
explains the mechanics of the Illinois" and Massachusetts' 8
apoproaches. Each approach is discussed in terms of the way it has
been utilized throughout Indiana's history. Finally, this note ex-
plains the current combination of the two approaches used in
Indiana today,'9 and suggests possible ways current law might be
modified in the future."°
11. See notes 124-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Massachusetts method.
12. See notes 80-123 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois method.
13. The 1968 case, Bixenman v. Hall, represents the current trend to favor
the Massachusetts method. 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968). See notes 124-64 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of Bixenman and the Massachusetts method.
Bottorff v. South Const. Co. represented the position of the Indiana Supreme Court at
the turn of the century when the Illinois approach was favored. 184 Ind. 222, 110 N.E.
977 (1916). See notes 80-123 infra and accompanying text for discussion of Bottorff and
the Illinois approach.
14. See notes 124-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the par-
tial abandonment of the Illinois method in favor of the Massachusetts method.
15. See notes 165-202 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the com-
bination of the Massachusetts and Illinois approaches currently in use in Indiana.
16. See notes 21-77 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of policy con-
siderations.
17. See notes 80-123 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois method.
18. See notes 124-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Massachusetts method.
19. See notes 165-202 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of current
state law.
20. See notes 203-13 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
posed modifications.
19821
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I. POLICY REASONS
FOR GIVING CHILDREN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION WHEN
CHARGED WITH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Though there is a general consensus among Indiana jurists that
the immaturity of a child plaintiff should be given special considera-
tion whenever contributory negligence is alleged, little is mentioned
in the cases to explain why children should be given such special
consideration.2 The courts point out that children are given special
treatment regarding their contract, property, and criminal rightsY
Beyond this, however, the courts have made little effort to justify
giving such special consideration to children charged with con-
tributory negligence.23
21. The following is an example of the typical reasons the courts give to ex-
plain why children should be given special consideration:
The cases . . . all recognize the rule that children of tender years
are not to be treated as persons of mature years. This is a reasonable and
humane rule, and any other would be a cruel reproach to the law, but the
law merits no such reproach, for throughout all its branches, whether of
tort or contract, there runs, like the marking red cord of the British navy,
a line distinguishing children of years too few to have judgment or discre-
tion from those old enough to possess and exercise those faculties. This is
a doctrine taught by every man's experience, and sanctioned by our law.
A departure from it would shock every one's sense of justice and humani-
ty.
Indianapolis, P. & C. R.R. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 180, 6 N.E. 310, 312 (1886).
22. The courts have pointed out other areas of the law where children are
given special consideration:
Our law protects children from the injurious effects of their contracts. It
limits their liability for torts. It protects their property and personal
rights by legislation and judicial decision. Courts are now considered
parens patriae" the supreme guardian of all infants. ...
Everywhere, [childhood] is known as the impressionable period when the
future adult may be molded in health, stature, morals, religion and
wisdom.... Our law ... has organized Juvenile Courts on the theory that
the regular criminal code and procedure is too stern and rigid to be ap-
plied to children.
Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 228 Ind. 518, 540-42, 92 N.E.2d 632, 643 (1950)
(Gilkinson, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
23. Other writers have noted the same lack of justification by the courts:
[Apparently] there is a strong policy in favor of protecting children from
losses attributable to their immaturity. It would be quite plausible ... for
a court to be more lenient toward children whose injuries are at-
tributable, not only to their immaturity, but also to conceded tortious con-
duct on the part of the defendant .... Yet the cases do not [explain why].
... The opinions are replete with loose language, sometimes altogether
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It can reasonably be argued that if such limited justification is
acceptable to the courts, there is no need to attempt to derive any
further justification.4 However, it seems inadequate to conclude that
children should be given special treatment when charged with con-
tributory negligence simply because children have been given
special treatment in other areas of the law in the past. To derive a
more appropriate explanation of why children should be given
special treatment, it is necessary to focus on the inherent dif-
ferences between children and adults.
It cannot be denied that children differ greatly from adults.
Besides the differences in physical capacity, the more legally signifi-
cant differences in mental capacity are also readily observable. 25
Whether these obvious differences should merit any special con-
sideration is a policy question that cannot be easily answered. In-
itially there appear to be three possible methods of dealing with
these differences when children are charged with contributory
negligence. 6 First, refuse to recognize any significance in the dif-
ferences and continue to apply the defense against children in the
unnecessary, sometimes equivocal, sometimes incomplete, and sometimes
even contradictory....
Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618, 619 (1927).
... Children do generally exercise a lesser caution for their own
safety than do adults. [T]his is common knowledge, [and everyone should
be] charged with the knowledge of it.
Id. at 619 n.3.
24. See generally Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23
MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924); Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE
L.J. 618 (1927).
25. The physical differences between children and adults are not relevent to
this discussion. The courts consistently make allowances for blindness, deafness, and
other physical handicaps. Goodman v. Norwalk Jewish Center, 145 Conn. 146, 139 A.2d
812 (1958) (crippled, lacking coordination on crutches); Apperson v. Lazro, 44 Ind. App.
186, 87 N.E. 97 (1918) (sight impaired); Mahan v. New York, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575
(1937) (short stature, unable to see over hood of auto); Otterbeck v. Lamb, 85 Nev, 456,
456 P.2d 855 (deaf). If a child's physical condition has any bearing on the
reasonableness of the child's conduct, the physical condition can be given the same con-
sideration as any other physical disability. See generally, Broek, The Right to Live in
the World. The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L.. REV. 841 (1966); Weisiger,
Negligence of the Physically Infirm, 24 N.C.L. REV. 187 (1945).
26. There actually are more than three possible methods of dealing with
children charged with contributory negligence. However, to simplify discussion only
those possibilities which are compatible with current legal realities will be discussed.
The first and second options represent antipodal extremes that no court follows. The
third option represents a range of possibilities between these two extremes. PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 157-68.
1982]
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same way it is normally applied against adults. 7 Second, conclude
that in order to give adequate consideration to children's limited
capacities the defendant must be completely prohibited from using
the defense against them. 8 Third, compromise and give some special
consideration to the child plaintiff yet still allow the defendant a
limited opportunity to make use of the defense. 9 Though the first
two methods of dealing with children charged with contributory
negligence basically have been rejected in favor of the third, the
correctness of that choice is better revealed by illustrating the pro-
blems inherent in the first two choices.
A. The Policy Consequences of Refusing to Grant Children Special
Consideration In Spite of Their Immaturity.
The easiest way to deal with a child charged with contributory
negligence is to deny the child any special consideration and apply
the defense against the child as it is normally applied against an
adult. Contributory negligence, as applied against adults in Indiana,
is defined as unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff which
is a contributing legal cause to the harm suffered." For the adult,
unreasonable conduct is defined as conduct falling below that of a
reasonable adult of ordinary prudence." If no special consideration is
given to a child charged with contributory negligence the usual
adult standard would apply. Thus, to establish contributory
negligence the defendant would only need to prove that the child's
conduct was below that normally expected of a reasonably prudent
adult under similar circumstances, and that such unreasonable con-
duct was a contributing legal cause of the child's injury. Rarely can
the conduct of an immature child be considered reasonable by adult
standards.2 Children are simply not as capable of protecting
themselves as are adults.3 Thus, using an adult standard would
27. See notes 30-40 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the first
option.
28. See notes 41-56 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the second
option.
29. See notes 57-77 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the third
option.
30. See note 4 supra for Indiana's definition of contributory negligence.
31. See Memorial Hosp. of South Bend v. Scott, 261 Ind. 27, 300 N.E.2d 50
(1973); Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968).
32. See Bohlen, supra note 24; PROSSER supra note 2, at 157-60; Shulman,
supra note 24, at 618-19. Note, Contributory Negligence of Children, 18 S.C.L. REV.
648 (1966).
33. See Bohlen, supra note 24; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 157-60; Shulman,
supra note 24, at 618-19. Note, supra note 32.
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make it easy for the defendant to prove a child contributorily
negligent in most cases." Consequently, to ignore the immaturity of
children and apply the defense against them as against adults, con-
ceivably would deny many children compensation, and many other-
wise negligent defendants would escape liability."
These consequences are contrary to the two main functions of
tort law: 6 providing a forum in which an injured party may be com-
pensated for harm done to him by another;" and, insuring that the
one responsible for the injury is made to compensate the injured
and is deterred from continuing such harmful conduct in the future. 8
However, if children are denied special treatment, many of those
charged with contributory negligence might be denied compensation
for their injuries,39 and many otherwise negligent defendants might
escape liability for their negligence. 0 Though denying children
34. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 157-60; Shulman, supra note 24, at 618-19.
35. If a child cannot meet the adult standard and is found contributorily
negligent, it follows that the child will not be compensated by the defendant. The
defendant's successful proof of contributory negligence will operate as an absolute bar
to the plaintiff's recovery. See note 6 supra and accompanying text for discussion of
the penalty aspect of the defense. Furthermore, if the defendant is successful at prov-
ing the child contributorily negligent, the defendant will escape liability. However, if
the defendant uses an adult standard (which is beyond the child's capacity to meet) to
prove that the child acted unreasonable, the defendant will realize an unfair advantage
over the child. Shulman, supra note 24, at 618-19; See also notes 21-22 supra and ac-
companying text for an Indiana view on the fairness of treating children as adults.
36. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942), reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (1955); See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 1-27.
37. Seavey, supra note 36, at 72-74; See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 127.
38. Seavey, supra note 36, at 72-74; See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 16-23;
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
39. See note 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text for an earlier discussion
of the effect refusing to give children special consideration has on the issues of com-
pensation and liability.
40. It is argued that people will alter their conduct if they know that failure
to do so might subject them to legal liability. It is therefore a function of tort law to
deter people from conducting themselves in certain harmful ways by making it known
that they might face legal liability if they engage in such conduct. See Seavey, supra
note 36, at 72-74. Intentional conduct might be deterred, but there is some question
whether negligent conduct can be deterred. See Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22
GEO. L.J. 674, 681-82 (1934). Though inadvertant (non-thinking) conduct might be im-
possible to deter, certain types of negligent conduct can be deterred. Id. An example
of a type of negligent conduct that might be deterred is the typical case where a prop-
erty owner maintains an attractive nuisance on his property. The knowledge that he
may be held liable for injuries to a child attracted to the premises may cause the prop-
erty owner to fence in his property or otherwise make it safer. See generally Plotzki
v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950). Thus, if it is known
that any liability for injuries to children can easily be escaped through the use of the
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special consideration and applying the defense against them as if
they were adults might be the easiest way of dealing with the
children's contributory negligence issue, it will necessarily con-
travene the two main functions of tort law.
B. The Policy Consequences of Completely Prohibiting The
Defendant From Using The Defense Against Children.
Another conceivable way of dealing with children charged with
contributory negligence is to conclude that in giving adequate con-
sideration to their limited capacities the defendant's use of the
defense against them must be completely prohibited. Prohibiting the
use of the defense against all children, a group which represents a
considerable portion of the population, 1 would necessarily challenge
or undermine much of the foundation underlying the defense. To
determine exactly how the defense would be undermined by such an
approach, it is first necessary to consider how the defense works
and why it was developed. 2
Though various theories have been advanced in support of the
contributory negligence defense, 3 no one theory alone can complete-
ly explain it." Some courts have stated that the purpose of the
contributory negligence defense, no one will be deterred from continuing any harmful
conduct.
41. Children under age eighteen represent approximately 29.6% of the total
United States population. All those under age twenty-one represent approximately
37.4% of the total population. Of the 216.8 million people in the United States, 64
million are under eighteen years old and 81 million are under twenty-one years old.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1978 (99th ed. 1978).
42. An early analysis of the development of the contributory negligence
defense was completed by Francis H. Bohlen in 1908.
The opinions in the earliest cases upon contributorily negli-gence.
offer no indication that the court is aware that any new doctrine is be-
ing announced. There is, therefore, no discussion of general principles, no
logical argument applying such principles to the particular facts and
showing that they necessitate the result reached by the court. All at-
tempts to ascertain upon what legal principle the defense of contributory
negligence is based, are therefore efforts ex post facto, to explain and ac-
count for a result already reached apparently unconsciously.
Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1908). Other writers have
reached the same conclusions. See also Lowndes, supra note 40; PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 427.
43. See notes 44 and 45 infra for a discusson of the theories that have been
advanced to support the defense.
44. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 428. See also Malone, The Formative Era of
Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1947).
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defense is to punish the plaintiff for his own misconduct and
discourage him from similar conduct in the future." Other courts
have said that the negligence of the plaintiff is an intervening or in-
sulating cause between the negligence of the defendant and the
plaintiff's injury that essentially makes the negligence of the defen-
dant irrelevant." The theories themselves are of little consequence.
What matters is the legal policy that seems to underlie the various
theories supporting the defense and how that policy will be affected
if the court prohibits the defendant from using the defense against
children.
Essentially, the basic legal policy underlying the contributory
negligence defense is that all individuals in society are to be held, to
some extent, responsible for their own self-harming conduct." View-
ed in conjunction with the policy underlying negligence law in
general, the policy underlying the contributory negligence defense
becomes more clear. Underlying the basic negligence action is the
notion that each individual is to be held legally responsible for the
consequences his negligent actions may have on others. 8 The compan-
ion policy that underlies the defense of contributory negligence re-
quires that each individual bear some responsibility for the self-
harming consequences of his own negligent conduct. 9 Accordingly, a
plaintiff proved to have been an unreasonable contributing legal
cause of his own harm, even a slight cause will be deemed to bear
the responsibility for his own injuries. Consequently, the plaintiff will
not be allowed to recover compensation from the defendant even
45. Though it has sometimes been argued that contributory negligent plain-
tiffs are denied recovery in order to punish them for their misconduct, this notion has
been soundly criticized. For a discussion of the penalty theory see Bohlen, supra note
42 at 233-34; Lowndes, supra note 42, at 679-81. See also PROSSER, supra note 2, at 427.
46. A number of writers have supported the theory that the plaintiff's
misconduct becomes the proximate cause of his own injury thereby making the con-
duct of the defendant unimportant. Bohlen, supra note 42, at 233-34; Green, Con-
tributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1927); Lowndes, supra
note 40; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 427-28.
47. The extent to which each individual is to be held responsible for his own
self-harming conduct will vary depending on the circumstances. PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 428. See generally Bohlen, supra note 42, at 233-35. For example, if the doctrine of
last clear chance is applicable, the court may be able to apply the doctrine and avoid
holding a plaintiff responsible for conduct which he otherwise might be held fully
responsible. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 437. See also MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
48. See Seavey, supra note 36, at 72-74; See also Terry, supra note 38.
49. See note 47 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy
underlying the contributory negligence defense.
1982]
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though the defendant may also have been partly responsible for the
injury."0
Refusing to hold children responsible for any unreasonable con-
tribution to their own injuries necessarily contravenes the policy
that each individual ought to be held responsible for his own self-
harming conduct. By definition, prohibiting application of the con-
tributory negligence defense against children is contrary to the
legal policy behind the defense. Accordingly, a child who knows he
will in no way be held responsible for his conduct may be encour-
aged to be careless and irresponsible." On the other hand, a child
who knows he may be held responsible for his own injurious conduct
may arguably be encouraged to be a careful and responsible
person." Whether any one child is actually encouraged to be more
careful if he is held contributorily negligent does not matter. A child
50. A plaintiff may be held to bear the full responsibility of an injury even
though he may only have been a minor cause.
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the
plaintiff is readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of
a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the
defepdant has played no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiff's
deviation from the community standard of conduct may even be relatively
slight, and the defendant's more extreme; the injured man is in all pro-
bability, for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear
the financial burden of his loss; and the answer of the law to all this is
that the defendant goes scot free of all liability, and the plaintiff bears it
all.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443.
51. If a person is encouraged to be careful by being held responsible for his
self-harming conduct, then a person not held responsible for his self-harming conduct
might arguably be encouraged to be careless. It is doubtful whether this is realistic.
However, Prosser acknowledges that such an argument can be used to support con-
tinued use of the contributory negligence defense. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44.
52. The purpose of holding a person responsible for his own self-harming con-
duct is to encourage him to be more responsible in the future. PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 443. See note 40 supra for a discussion of the principle of deterrence. However,
Prosser and others would argue that the idea of deterrence is unrealistic.
[It is no] answer to say that the contributory negligence rule promotes
caution by making the plaintiff responsible for his own safety. It is quite
as reasonable to say that it encourages negligence, by giving the defen-
dant reason to hope that he will escape the consequences. Actually any
such idea of deterrence is quite unrealistic. In the usual case, the
negligence on both sides will consist of mere inadvertance or inattention,
or an error in judgment, and is quite unlikely that forethought of any
legal liability will in fact be in the mind of either party.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 444. See Lowndes, supra note 42, at 681-82. Though Prosser
points out the defects in the principle of deterrence, he nonetheless acknowleges that
it is used to justify the contributory negligence defense. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443.
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held free from all legal responsibility will have no incentive to con-
duct himself with care other than the natural incentive of fear of
personal injury.53 Even if irresponsibility is only slightly encouraged,
such encouragement will necessarily be contrary to the policy
underlying the defense. 4 Furthermore, even slight encouragement
of irresponsible conduct in children will contravene society's tacit
goal to train and educate its children to be responsible self-
protecting and self-sufficient adults.55 Completely prohibiting the use
of the defense against children frustrates the basic policy underly-
ing the contributory negligence defense." Thus, the option to pro-
hibit the use of the defense against children is essentially no more
practical than the first option to totally refuse children special con-
sideration.
C. The Policy Consequences of Giving Some Special Consideration
To Children While Still Allowing The Defendant Limited Use of
The Defense
A third way to deal with the problems" of children's con-
tributory negligence is to give special consideration to the
immaturity of the child while allowing the defendant an opportunity
to make limited use of the defense." Since, by definition, using the
defense against children is not prohibited under this option, the
53. If the threat of being held legally responsible for the consequences of his
actions deters a person from harmful conduct, it does so only as long as the person is
aware of the threat. If there is no threat or the person is not made aware of the threat
there can be no deterrence. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44. See Lowndes, supra note
42, at 681-83. If there is no threat of legal responsibility, there can be no deterrence.
Thus, if there is no external legal sanction, any incentive to act carefully will have to
come from the individual himself, such as a fear that carelessness will lead to personal
injury. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44.
54. If carelessness and irresponsibility are only slightly encouraged, such en-
couragement will be contrary to the purpose of the defense, which is to encourage
carefulness and responsibility. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44. See also Lowndes,
supra note 42, at 681-83.
55. See Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 228 Ind. 518, 540-42, 92 N.E.2d
632, 642 (1950) (Gilkinson, J., dissenting).
56. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44. See also Lowndes, supra note 42, at
681-83.
57. This third option is really not one option at all, but rather it holds within
itself a multiplicity of lesser alternatives. See notes 57-77 infra and accompanying text
for details.
58. See generally Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Bot-
torff v. South Const. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916); Hobby Shops, Inc. v.
Drudy, 161 Ind. App. 699, 317 N.E.2d 473 (1974); Indianapolis v. Williams, 115 Ind.
App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945).
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defendant is allowed to prove unreasonable conduct on the part of
the plaintiff. To accomodate the child's special needs, the adult stan-
dard is replaced by a special standard which focuses the jury's at-
tention on the individual child's limited mental capacity. 9 Under this
option, the immaturity of the child is given special consideration by
the jury, and yet the defendant still has an opportunity to escape
liability if he can prove that the child unreasonably contributed to
his own harm.
Unlike the first option to refuse children special consideration,
this option gives the child plaintiff a substantial opportunity to
recover compensation for his injuries."0 Since the reasonableness of
the child plaintiff's conduct is judged by what is reasonable for a
child of the same mental capacity, the chance of finding that the
child acted reasonably is better than if his conduct were judged by
an adult standard. 1 Under this approach there is a greater chance
that the child will not be found to have unreasonably contributed to
his own harm and as a result the child will less likely be denied com-
pensation for his injuries. Also, in contrast to the first option to
refuse children special consideration, since the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's conduct is determined according to the child's mental
capacity under this approach, the defendant's chances of escaping
liability by using the defense is reduced.2 As a result, the defendant
and those in a similar position, might arguably be more discouraged
from continuing similar harmful conduct 3 than if the courts applied
adult standards to the children and granted few recoveries. Accord-
ingly, unlike the first option which contravenes the functions of the
59. The care that must be exercised by a child in Indiana is measured by the
care that "children of like age, knowledge, judgment and experience would ordinarily
exercise under like conditions and circumstances." Tabor v. Continental Baking Co.,
110 Ind. App. 633, 641, 38 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1942); e.g., Town of Argos v. Harly, 114 Ind.
App. 290, 49 N.E.2d 552 (1943).
60. See Seavey, supra note 36, at 72-4; see also Terry, supra note 38.
61. See generally authorities cited at note 60 supra.
62. See generally authorities cited at note 40 supra for a discussion of the
deterrence principle.
63. If a child's conduct is determined according to an adult standard, the
chances are great that the child will fail to meet that standard and will be found con-
tributorily negligent. On the other hand, if the standard is designed to accomodate the
capacity of the child, the chances that the child will meet the standard will be much
greater. If the child's chances of meeting the standards are greater, the defendant's
chances of proving contributory negligence and escaping liability will necessarily be
reduced. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44.
64. See generally authorities cited at note 40 supra for a discussion of the
deterrence principle.
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tort action by refusing children any special consideration, this option
provides children any special consideration, 'this option provides
children with a fair opportunity to be compensated for their injuries
and effectively discourages future harmful conduct by the defen-
dant.
Compared to the second option to prohibit the use of the
defense against children, the third compromise option also proves to
be preferable. Looking into a child's conduct to determine if it is
reasonable in view of the child's maturity is certainly more com-
patable with the policy that each person ought to be held respon-
sible for his own self-harming conduct, than is the option to prohibit
looking into the reasonableness of the child's conduct. 5 Thus, unlike
the second option, the third option is also compatable with the legal
policy underlying the contributory negligence defense, that every-
one be held responsible for his self-harming conduct.
As a result of its fairness and compatability with basic policy,
the third compromise option is favored in the Indiana courts.'
However, there has been considerable disagreement on exactly how
this type of approach should be applied. 7 The disagreement has
arisen because this third option is really not one option at all, but
rather it suggests a multiplicity of lesser alternatives." One jurisdic-
tion following this approach might choose to give extensive con-
sideration to the immaturity of children,6 9 while another might
choose to give only moderate consideration."' Indeed, the exact
amount of special consideration given to children charged with con-
tributory negligence varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 All
65. See notes 47-56 supra for a discussion of the policy underlying the con-
tributory negligence defense and the effect that granting special consideration to
children has on the policy.
66. See cases cited at note 58 supra.
67. See note 9 supra for a discussion of these disagreements.
68. See note 26 supra for a discussion of how the three options relate to each
other.
69. E.g., Giacoble v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 224, 102 N.E. 322 (1913)
(illustrating the Massachusetts method).
70. The Illinois method is illustrated in Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill.
410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902).
71. The following is a sampling of various jurisdictions illustrating some of
the different approaches possible: Harden v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 380 (D. Ga.
1980) (age fifteen capacity is question for jury); Proctor v. United States, 443 F. Supp.
113 (D. Ala. 1977) (under seven no capacity); Talley v. J. & L. Oil Co., __ Kan. __
579 P.2d 706 (1978) (under nine no capacity); White v. Nicosia, 351 So. 2d 234 (La. Ct.
App. 1977) (capacity is a factual issue); Kirby v. Carson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400
(1977) (under seven no capacity); Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 250 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1977)
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that is required to fit within the broad terms of the option is that
the special consideration given to the child not be so great that it
prohibits the use of the defense nor so little that the child ends up
treated as an adult.
Of the many possible variations open to the courts under the
broad language of the third option, only two have received wide sup-
port in Indiana."2 One approach, known as the Illinois method, found
strong support at the turn of the centruy at a time when the courts
were concerned with administrative expedience.7" The other ap-
proach, which is favored today, is known as the Massachusetts
method.7" The Massachusetts approach, as applied in Indiana,
reflects a contemporary concern with insuring that a fair and
equitable balance is struck among the various competing policies so
that no one policy is favored more than another." Indiana's use of
the Illinois and Massachusetts methods is discussed in detail in
order to explain the present state of the law concerning children's
contributory negligence in Indiana"6 and predict its future."
II. THE ILLINOIS AND MASSACHUSETTS METHODS AS EACH
RELATES TO THE LAW IN INDIANA TODAY -
There has been general agreement in Indiana that an immature
child charged with contributory negligence should be granted some
type of special consideration by the courts and that use of the
defense against children should be limited." However, there has
never been complete agreement on how much special consideration
is needed or to what extent the defense should be limited. One ap-
proach to the problem that Indiana favored at the turn of the cen-
(under seven capacity is a question of fact); Caparoco v. Lambert, - R.I. - , 402
A.2d 1180 (1979) (capacity is a factual issue).
72. See generally cases cited in note 71 supra for examples of possible varia-
tions open to the courts under the broad language of the third option.
73. See notes 80-123 infra and accompanyiung text for a discussion of the Il-
linois method.
74. See notes 124-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Massachusetts method.
75. See notes 124-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
policy orientation of the Massachusetts method.
76. See notes 165-202 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of current
law.
77. See notes 203-13 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
posed modifications to make contributory negligence fairer.
78. See notes 7 and 21 supra for a discussion of the consensus between In-
diana jurists.
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tury has sometimes been referred to as the Illinois method or the
"arbitrary" method."9
A. The Illinois Method And Early Indiana Law
The Illinois method of dealing with an immature child charged
with contributory negligence is analogous to the approach the com-
mon law utilized when considering the capacity of a child to commit
a crime.' The Indiana version of the approach was first explicitly
stated in Bottorff v. South Constr. Co. in 1916:
It has been laid down by the law writers and the courts
that the time of infancy is divided into three periods, dur-
ing each of which different presumptions prevail; the first
is that up to the age of seven years, during which the in-
fant is conclusively presumed to be incapable of
understanding the nature of the crime and can in no way
be held responsible therefore; the second is that between
the ages of seven and fourteen years. An infant between
these ages is presumed to be incapable of committing
crime, but the presumption may be rebutted by proof that
the infant possessed sufficient discretion to be aware of
the nature of the act. The third period is after the age of
fourteen years when the infant is presumed to be capable
of committing a crime and can be held the same as an
adult. It seems that the greater weight of authority is to
the effect that the same rule applies in negligence cases."
It is apparent from this statement that in 1916 children under age
seven were considered to be without the capacity to understand the
harmful consequences of their conduct and hence were conclusively
presumed incapable of being contributorily negligent.2 Similarly,
children between the ages of seven and fourteen were also presum-
ed to be without the capacity to understand the consequences of
79. Note, Contributory Negligence of Children In Indiana. Capacity And
Standard Of Care, 34 IND. L.J. 511 (1959).
80. Id. at 656.
81. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 227, 110 N.E. 977, 983 (1916). It
has been argued that much of what was said in Bottorff was dicta. Note supra note 79.
Since Bottorff dealt specifically with the question of the contributory negligence of a
fourteen-year-old and a twelve-year-old. By Indiana's own definition, any discussion of
the liability of children of other ages is dictum. 184 Ind. at 227, 110 N.E. at 983. This
dictum was subsequently followed, however, and for a time became authoritative law.
Brush v. Public Serv. Co., 106 Ind. App. 544, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939); Kent v. Interstate
Pub. Serv. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 168 N.E. 465 (1929).
82. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916).
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their conduct. However, this presumption was considered rebuttable
and children in this age range could be found contributorily
negligent if first proven to have sufficient capacity to appreciate the
particular danger." Also apparent from the court's statement in Bot-
torff is that children over fourteen were automatically considered to
possess the capacity to understand the full consequences of their
conduct and as a result were presumed capable of being contribu-
torily negligent.8 ' However, what was not so apparent was exactly
how these presumptions operated in an actual trial setting and what
standard of care was applied those found capable of contributory
negligence.
The Illinois approach is actually more arbitrary than it might
first appear. The trial judge is required to classify each child as a
member of one of the three age groups. 5 The decision is based
solely on the age of the child. The judge has little or no discretion in
the matter. 6 If the child is below age seven the court automatically
presumes that the child does not possess the capacity to be con-
tributorily negligent and the defendant is precluded from using the
defense. 7 At the other age extreme, if the child is above age four-
83. Ild.
84. Id
85. Note, supra note 79.
86. It is appropriate here to point out a confusing and exasperating eccen-
tricity of the Indiana courts. The confusion arises from Indiana's use of the term sui
juris and its negative non sui juris in reference to children's capacity to be con-
tributory negligent. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979), the
term sui juris is a latin term meaning under no legal disability. In the 19th and early
20th centuries, Indiana began using the term sui juris with reference to children's
capacity to be contributorily negligent. E.g., Dull v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, &
St. Louis Ry., 21 Ind. App. 571, 52 N.E. 1013 (1899). Correspondingly, the term non sui
juris was used to refer to a child's incapacity to be contributorily negligent. E.g., City
of Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N.E. 47 (1900). The exact meaning of the
terms became clouded when the courts, after making a finding of non sui juris,
needlessly discussed standard of care in obitur dictum. E.g., Indianapolis St. Ry. v.
Schomberg, 164 Ind. 11, 72 N.E. 1041 (1905). The use and misuse of these terms have
caused needless confusion. This writer believes there is ample support for a conclusion
that sui juris was meant to be synonymous with capacity, and that non sui juis was
meant to be synonymous with incapacity. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Schomberg, 115 Ind.
App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945) (thorough discussion of these terms). See Cole v. Sear-
foss, 49 Ind. App. 334, 97 N.E. 345 (1912); Keller v. Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670, 36 N.E.
303 (1894); see also, Note, supra note 79, at 514-19. To alleviate confusion, these latin
terms will not be used in this Note, rather, their English counterparts will be used in-
stead. This is consistent with more recent Indiana decisions, which use the latin terms
less frequently. Morre v. Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech. 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462
(1975); Hobby Shops, Inc. v. Drudy, 161 Ind. App. 699, 317 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
87. Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902).
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teen the court automatically presumes that the child has the same
capacity to be contributorily negligent as an adult.8 Once found to
have an adult capacity, the jury then is instructed to measure the
reasonableness of the child's conduct by what a reasonable adult of
ordinary prudence would have done under the same circumstances. 9
If the child is between age seven and fourteen, the court is required
to instruct the jury to presume that the child was not capable of
contributory negligence. The defendant, however, is allowed to
prove to the jury that the child did in fact possess the capacity to
understand the nature of his conduct and is capable of contributory
negligence. 1 It is not clear whether the jury is then to be instructed
to measure the reasonableness of the child's conduct by an adult
standard or by a lesser standard adjusted to the capacity of the
plaintiff.2 What is clear, however, is that as a practical matter the
Illinois approach is essentially arbitrary, with the age of the child
serving as the decisive factor for determining how the child will be
treated. 3
Of the several policy reasons that might be advanced to sup-
port such an arbitrary approach the most obvious one is that the Il-
linois approach furthers the goal of administrative expediency. At
neither age extreme is there needed any evidence of the child's in.
dividual abilities or incapacities. The only proof needed in order to
determine which of the three categories the child fits into is proof of
the child's age. Once age is properly proven the court quickly
decides how the child is to be treated. If the child is proven to be
below age seven, the contributory negligence issue ceases to be im-
portant in the trial. 6 If the'child is proven to be above age fourteen,
proof of contributory negligence proceeds just as if the plaintiff
were an adult. 7 Even the court's problems with children age seven
88. Peterson v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 231 Ill. 324, 83 N.E. 159 (1907).
89. Id.
90. Thomas v. Price, 81 Ill. App. 3d 542, 401 N.E.2d 651 (1980); Hardy v.
Smith, 61 Ill. App. 3d 441, 378 N.E.2d 604 (1978); Piechalak v. Liberty Trucking Co., 58
Ill. App. 2d 289, 208 N.E.2d 379 (1965).
91. See generally cases cited note 90 supra.
92. See generally cases cited note 90 supra.
93. Note, supra note 78.
94. Wilderman, Presumptions Existing In Favor Of The Infant In Re: The
Question Of An Infant's Ability To Be Guilty Of Contributry Negligence, 10 IND. L.J.
427 (1935).
95. See notes 81-93 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
mechanics of the Illinois approach.
96. Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 977 (1902).
97. Peterson v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 231 Ill. 324, 83 N.E. 159 (1907).
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to fourteen are simplified. Since these children are presumed in-
capable of contributory negligence they are treated as incapable,
unless the defendant wants to challenge the presumption. If the
presumption is challenged and rebutted there may be some diffi-
culty in deciding what standard of care to apply, but once that
standard is determined the process of proving unreasonable conduct
under that standard and proving contributing cause proceeds as
usual.98
Other policy reasons that might be advanced to support the Il-
linois approach are not so obvious. Since the practical effect of the
Illinois approach is to divide children into three groups which are
each treated differently, it seems plausible that each of the three
groups can be supported on different policy grounds. The first
group, those below age seven, are well protected under the Illinois
approach. Use of the defense against those below age seven is com-
pletely prohibited.9 Since the defense cannot be used against those
under seven, they cannot be denied compensation because of con-
tributory negligence. Consequently, there is no conflict with the
policy to provide compensation for injury."' Likewise, since the
defendant cannot rely on the defense as a means of escaping liability
he might arguably be discouraged from continuing the harmful ac-
tivity in the future. This would be consistent with the policy of
deterrence. 1 ' On the other hand, refusing to look into the conduct of
the very young would not be consistent with the policy underlying
the contributory negligence defense, that all individuals in society
are to be held to some extent responsible'" for their own self-
harming conduct. However, in the case of the very young this incon-
sistency might be justifiable since those under seven would prob-
ably not be capable of understanding or living up to the responsibili-
ty."0 3 Since the contributory negligence defense cannot be used to
98. See generally cases cited note 22 supra.
99. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916).
100. See generally notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of compensation.
101. See generally notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of deterrence.
102. See generally notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
why a refusal to consider whether a child is contributorily negligent contravenes the
purpose of the defense.
103. Prosser points out that it is unreasonable to assume that an adult acting
carelessly is, or should be, meditating on the consequences his actions may have on a
future lawsuit. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 428. If it is unreasonable to assume an adult
meditates on the legal consequences of his conduct, it cannot be reasonable to assume
that a child meditates about such things. Id.
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deny compensation for their injuries, children below age seven are
not held responsible for their self-harming conduct, and since the
defendant cannot rely on the defense to escape liability he may be
encouraged to discontinue his harmful conduct.
The second group, those between the ages of seven and four-
teen, is also protected under the Illinois approach. However, the
presumption that children in this age group are incapable of con-
tributory negligence is rebuttable.' Once the child is proven
capable of contributory negligence it is unclear whether the
reasonableness of the child's conduct then is to be judged by an
adult standard or a lesser standard adjusted to the capacity of the
individual child.'0 5 A child plaintiff would have a better opportunity
for compensation if he could have his conduct judged according to a
special standard than if his conduct is compared to an adult stand-
ard of reasonableness. However, a child judged according to an adult
standard can still be considered to have some opportunity for com-
pensation since he must first be proven capable of understanding
and appreciating the consequences of his conduct before the defend-
ant can proceed to prove unreasonable contributory conduct.' Thus,
the treatment of children in this second group is also consistent
with the general policy to provide a plaintiff a forum through which
he may be compensated for his injuries. Similarly, defendants who
are sued by children in this age group, knowing that it may not be
easy to prove contributory negligence and escape liability, might
arguably be discouraged from continuing their harmful conduct in
the future. This would be in accord with a general policy of deter-
rence.' 7 Also, since there is the possibility that a child in this age
group may be found capable of contributory negligence there is a
chance that the reasonableness of his conduct will be an issue.
Therefore, the policy that every individual should be held to some
extent responsible for his own self-harming conduct is potentially
furthered."8
Those in the third group, which includes children above age
,fourteen, are afforded no special consideration under the Illinois ap-
104. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916).
105. Note, supra note 79.
106. See generally notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of compensation.
107. See generally notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of deterrence.
108. See generally notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy underlying the defense.
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proach. °9 Though children slightly above age fourteen are not nor-
mally thought of as being adults, they are treated as if they were
adults under this approach."' Since they probably cannot measure
up to the adult standard, children in this age group will undoubtedly
be denied compensation more often than if the reasonableness of
their conduct was judged according to their individual capacities."'
Similarly, a defendant sued by a child of this age group might
possibly find it fairly easy to prove contributory negligence under
an adult standard, and as a result might find little reason to discon-
tinue the harmful conduct that led to the plaintiff's injury."2
However, treating children in this age group as adults could
possibly have the long term effect of coercing younger children to
conduct themselves as reasonable adults. Therefore, though the
defendant's harmful conduct may not be deterred, the policy that
each person be held responsible for his own self-harming conduct is
conceivably furthered."3
Though the various policies mentioned are all given different
emphasis depending on which age group attention is focused, it
should be recalled that the chief policy underlying the entire Illinois
approach is administrative expediency." ' No policy other than ad-
ministrative expediency can adequately explain why children are
divided into three age groups in such an arbitrary manner.'
Moreover, the administrative expediency of the approach has been a
point that has received considerable praise. The Illinois method has
been heralded as yielding uniform and predictable results."' It is
contended that the practicing attorney needs this consistency in
order to determine the merits of each client's case."7 The supporters
of the Illinois approach argue that the benefits of administrative
simplicity far outweigh any alleged shortcomings."8
Critics of the Illinois approach, on the other hand, do not feel
that the arbitrariness and inflexibility of the approach is justified by
109. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916).
110. Id See also cases cited in note 90 supra.
111. See generally notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of compensation.
112. See generally notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of deterrence.
113. See generally notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
policy underlying the defense.
114. See Wilderman, supra note 94.
115. Id See also PROSSER, note 2 supra, at 158-59.
116. See Wilderman, supra note 94.
117. Id
118. Id.; Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124 (1958).
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its administrative expediency."" The critics have argued that the
capacity of a child to understand and avoid particular dangers does
not depend so much on age as it does on mental development. 20
They argue that it is wrong to consider only age to the neglect of
other important indicators of a child's capacity. 2' Besides age, they
favor consideration of the child's educational background, judgment,
and experience.' 2 Because of these criticisms, the Illinois approach
gradually began to lose favor in Indiana.'
B. The Massachusett's Method And Recent Indiana Law.
Though the Indiana courts appeared to favor the Illinois
method at the turn of the century, the approach soon lost support.
After the Indiana Supreme Court announced its version of the ap-
proach in Bottorff v. South Constr. Co. in 1916, it was followed only
twice in subsequent cases before the appellate court. 2' Many of the
defects in the Illinois method began to make themselves apparent in
the 1940's. l20
A particularly revealing case of the 1940's concerned a sixteen
year old boy with a proven mental capacity of a normal twelve year
119. In Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. R., 93 Vt. 132, 135, 106 A. 682, 685
(1919), the Illinois approach was soundly criticized:
While the rule has merit of simplicity, it is purely arbitrary and
lacks the sanction of reason and experience .... The test of age alone is
not sufficient. Much depends on the circumstances of the situation of the
particular case, especially the mental development and previous training
and experience of the child.
120. "A rule that age, not sense; years, not intelligence; length of life, not ex-
perience, should govern responsibility for human action is unsound and should be
disgarded." Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 27, 840 (1938) (Potter, J., dissent-
ing).
121. In Hellstern v. Smelowitz, 17 N.J. Super. 366, 377, 86 A.2d 265, 271 (1952),
the court stated:
Under the so-called Illinois rule a boy who is one day under seven years
of age, may be guilty of the most flagrant contributory carelessness and
yet evidence of his exceptional precocity and breadth of judgment and ex-
perience cannot by introduced to overcome the illusory presumption of
baby like puerility.
122. See generally Note, supra note 79.
123. Id
124. Brush v. Public Serv. Co., 106 Ind. App. 544, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939); Kent v.
Interstate Pub. Serv. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 168 N.E. 465 (1929).
125. Indianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115 Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945);
Town of Argos v. Harly, 114 Ind. App. 290, 49 N.E.2d 552 (1943); Tabor v. Continental
Baking Co., 110 Ind. App. 633, 38 N.E.2d 257 (1942).
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old.'26 Such an atypical child could not be conveniently classified into
one of the three Illinois age groups. The dilemma posed by this
atypical child seriously challenged the theory underlying the Illinois
method. If the mental age of such a child is acknowledged, the child
should be treated as a member of the seven to fourteen age group.
However, if chronological age is the only factor examined, such a
child must be treated as a member of the above fourteen age group.
The court avoided this troublesome problem and simply allowed the
jury to decide whether the child had the capacity to be
contributorily negligent without actually categorizing the child.127 In
the cases that followed, however, it became clear that the Illinois ap-
proach, as stated in Bottorff, could no longer be accepted as an ac-
curate statement of the law in Indiana. 128
The approach that emerged to dominate children's contributory
negligence law today in Indiana is known as the Massachusetts
method."2 Under the Massachusetts method a court does not de-
termine a child's capacity simply on evidence of the child's age. Age
is considered, but other factors such as the child's intelligence,
educational background, and judgment are also examined. 3 ' Under
the Massachusetts approach a child's capacity to be contributorily
negligent is ascertained by looking at the whole child13 and de-
termining whether the particular child was able to recognize and
cope with the particular danger that confronted him at the time of
his injury.3 2 Where reasonable minds cannot differ the determina-
tion is made by the court.'33 Where there is a possibility that
reasonable minds can differ the jury determines whether the in-
dividual child possessed the capacity to be contributorily
negligent.
34
126. Wise v. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 Ind. App. 681, 34 N.E.2d 975
(1941).
127. Id. This is the appellate courts' view of the trial court's proceedings.
128. See generally cases cited in note 125 supra.
129. E.g., Giacoble v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 224, 102 N.E. 322
(1913)(illustrating the Massachusetts method).
130. Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mill, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N.E. 876 (1911).
131. A child's capacity is ascertained by examining the whole child, including
the child's educational background, intelligence, and judgment as well as age. Note,
supra note 79.
132. The court determines what the child's capacity was at the time he was
confronted by the danger which led to his injury. The court is not concerned with the
child's capacity at the time of trial. See Wozniczka v. McKean, 144 Ind. App. 471, 247
N.E.2d 215 (1969)(action by adult for injuries sustained when child).
133. Stewart v. Jeffries, 159 Ind. App. 693, 309 N.E.2d 443 (1974).
134. Indianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115 Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945); Ac-
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Once a child plaintiff is determined to possess the requisite
capacity to be contributorily negligent,13 the defendant is then
allowed to prove unreasonable conduct on the part of the child that
was a contributing legal cause of the child's injury.13 However,
under the Massachusetts approach, unlike the Illinois approach, a
special child's standard of care is used to measure the
reasonableness of the child's conduct. ' Under the Massachusetts ap-
proach, the standard of care required of a child to avoid being held
contributorily negligent is "such care as a child of like age, in-
telligence, and experience would ordinarily exercise under like cir-
cumstances." '138 Though appearing objective, 3 ' the standard is ac-
tually fairly subjective, because it takes into account the variances
in capacity between children of different ages, and also the
variances in knowledge, judgment, and experience between children
of the same age group. 4 '
Even though the knowledge, judgment, and experience of
cord Heiny Adm'x v. Pennsylvania R.R., 221 Ind. 367, 47 N.E.2d 145 (1943); see e.g.,
Swanson v. Schroat, 169 Ind. App. 80, 85, 345 N.E.2d 872, 879 (1976).
135. In other words, once it is determined that the child was able to recognize
and cope with the particular danger that confronted him, then the defendant is allowed
to prove unreasonable conduct.
136. In 1974 Judge Garrard stated: "Knowledge and appreciation of the peril
are essential elements of contributory negligence." Hobby Shops, Inc. v. Drudy, 161
Ind. App. 699, 709, 317 N.E.2d 473, 479 (1974); Note, supra note 32; accord PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 157-60.
137. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Moore v.
Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech. 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462 (1975); Hobby Shops, Inc.
v. Drudy, 161 Ind. App. 699, 317 N.E.2d 473 (1974); Indianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115
Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945).
138. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976). This would
be an appropriate jury instruction. Id
139. The following is an accurate representation of how the standard is ar-
ticulated under the Massachusetts approach:
The mental capacity, the knowledge and experience of the par-
ticular child, are to be taken into consideration in each case. These
qualities are individualized- subjective-but only for the purpose of
determining whether the child was capable of perceivng the risk of injury
to himself and of avoiding the danger. Beyond that, there is an objective
standard. In determining whether or not his conduct was proper in view
of his intelligence, knowledge, and experience, his conduct is to be com-
pared with that of the cateful and prudent child of similar qualities. Just
as in the case of adults, one of the qualities of the standard "reasonable
man" is consistent carefulness of prudence, so in the case of infants, the
element of prudence is standardized.
Shulman, supra note 24, at 620 (emphasis in original).
140. Id PROSSER, supra note 2, at 158.
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children were not considered under the Illinois approach, each is of
prime importance under the Massachusetts approach."' Each factor
goes to a separate aspect of mental capacity. Knowledge goes to the
child's educational background; judgment refers to the child's ability
to use such knowledge appropriately; and experience goes to the
child's skill at applying his education and judgment.' Age is only a
secondary factor, and is basically used to focus the factfinder's at-
tention on the difference between what children in general might do
in a given situation as compared to what children of one particular
age would do in the same situation."' Thus, the Massachusetts ap-
proach treats the child's age as secondary to his knowledge, judg-
ment, and experience.
The differences between the two approaches can best be il-
lustrated by again considering the case of a child age sixteen with
the mental capacity of a twelve year old.'" Unlike the Illinois ap-
proach, the Massachusetts approach is flexible enough to deal with
such a child. Under the Massachusetts approach the court first
determines whether the child was capable of recognizing and dealing
with the particular danger that confronted him."5 Once the child is
determined to be capable of contributory negligence, the jury then
determines whether the child acted reasonably for a child of such
age, intelligence, and experience. 1' The standard that a court would
direct the jury to apply in this situation would be such care as
would be reasonable for a child with the knowledge, judgment, and
experience of a twelve year old. 4 ' Chronological age would be disre-
garded and the jury's attention would be focused on what would be
reasonable for a twelve year old rather than what would be reason-
able for a sixteen year old. Therefore, the mentally deficient child
receives better accomodation under the Massachusetts -approach
141. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
142. Id.; Moore v. Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech. 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d
462 (1975); Hobby Shops, Inc. v. Drudy, 161 Ind. App. 699, 317 N.E.2d 473 (1974); In-
dianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115 Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945).
143. E.g., Hollowell v. Greenfield, 142 Ind. App. 344, 216 N.E.2d 537 (1966).
144. Wise v. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 Ind. App. 681, 34 N.E.2d 975
(1941).
145. See note 135 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the process
used to determine a child's capacity.
146. See cases cited in note 142 supra.
147. See notes 141-43 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the
relative importance of chronological and mental age under the Massachusetts ap-
proach.
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than he would under the more arbitrary Illinois method. " 8
While the Massachusetts approach is more flexible and ac-
comodating than the Illinois method, administrative expediency and
predictability are sacrificed.' 9 Unlike the Illinois approach, the
Massachusetts approach vests considerable discretion in the trial
court.' A court utilizing the Massachusetts approach is not locked
into any arbitrarily predetermined result. The court is free to con-
sider all aspects of the child in determining what special treatment
the child is to be afforded. Consequently, the results are not as
predictable 5 ' as under the Illinois approach. In addition, the
Massachusetts approach is more time consuming than the Illinois
method. It takes more time to hear proof of a child's intelligence and
educational background than it does to simply hear proof of the
child's age. It also takes more time to evaluate the additional
evidence."' While the Massachusetts approach is more flexible and
accomodating than the Illinois method, it is also tends to be more
time consuming and the results are ultimately less predictable.
Although the policy goal of administrative expediency is not
strongly advanced under the Massachusetts approach, some of the
other policy goals are reinforced. For instance, under the Mass-
achusetts approach the child plaintiff is provided a fair opportunity
for compensation. " In every case the child's capacity to be contri-
butorily negligent is individually evaluated."' If the child is found
capable of contributorily negligent then the reasonableness of the
child's conduct is determined according to an individual and subjec-
tive standard of care that takes the child's age, knowledge, judg-
ment, and experience into account."' Therefore, it cannot be argued
that children are being unfairly refused compensation under the
Massachusetts approach.
In addition, since the plaintiff will have a fair opportunity for
compensation,'56 the defendant will not be able to rely on the con-
148. See cases cited in note 142 supra.
149. Note, supra note 32.
150. Id
151. Wilderman, supra note 94.
152. Id See generally Note, supra note 32.
153. See generally notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the policy of compensation.
154. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
155. Id
156. See generally notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
policy of deterrence.
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tributory negligence defense as an easy way to escape liability.57
The defendant, therefore, may be inclined to consider altering his
own conduct to avoid similar negligence suits in the future. 58 Fur-
thermore, the child, while given special treatment, is still not com-
pletely allowed to escape responsibility for contributing on his own
harm. Hence, despite all the special consideration given the child
under the Massachusetts approach, the policy underlying the
defense that all individuals should be held responsible for their own
self-harming conduct still operates to insure that the child does not
unfairly escape responsibility for his own negligence.159 Thus, the
policies of compensation and deterrence, as well as the policy of
holding each person responsible for his own self-harming conduct,
are all mutually reinforced under the Massachusetts approach.
While the Massachusetts approach is compatible with the
various policies mentioned above, it has been praised primarily for
its flexibility and accomodating nature.'" Unlike the Illinois ap-
proach, the Massachusetts approach permits a more complete, albeit
subjective, analysis of the abilities and disabilities of each individual
child.' On the other hand, this more accomodating approach is often
criticized for focusing too much attention on the characteristics of
each particular child plaintiff. Since a decision in any one case relies
heavily on the facts of that particular case, the holding will have lit-
tle precedential value.' 2 Similar cases with slightly different fact
situations may have different results. This leads to confusion among
the courts and among practicing attorneys attempting to estimate
the merits of their cases before going to court."3
Despite these minor criticisms, Indiana has favored the
Massachusetts method in recent years.'" However, the transition
from the Illinois method to the Massachusetts method is not yet
complete. At present Indiana uses some portion of both methods.
157. See generally notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
general policy underlying the defense.
158. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-44; see also Lowndes, supra note 40, at
679-81.
159. 1I
160. Note, supra note 32.
161. Id. Shulman, supra note 24.
162. Wilderman, supra note 94; see generally Note, supra note 32.
163. Wilderman, supra note 94.
164. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Lanoux v.
Hagar, 159 Ind. App. 646, 308 N.E.2d 873 (1974); Stewart v. Jeffries, 159 Ind. App. 693,
309 N.E.2d 443 (1974); Hollowell v. Greenfield, 142 Ind. App. 344, 216 N.E.2d 537 (1966).
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III. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN INDIANA 1982: A BLEND OF THE
ILLINOIS APPROACH AND THE MASSACHUSETTS APPROACH.
Though the Bottorff'65 version of the Illinois method had some
following in the years subsequent to its pronouncement, 6' the ap-
proach gradually began to lose favor.167 In 1968, in Bixenman v.
Hall,' the Indiana Supreme Court substantially altered its approach
to the problem of children's contributory negligence. Bixenman was
the court's first major decision on the issue of children's contribu-
tory negligence since 1916 and a great deal of the earlier Bottorff
ruling was essentially rejected. In Bixenman'6 9 the various Bottorff
presumptions applicable to children age seven to the age of majority
were rejected in favor of the more accomodating Massachusetts
method. However, the Bottorff presumptions applicable to children
under age seven were not rejected or even considered in the case.
Bixenman dealt specifically with a thirteen year old bicyclist
who violated a traffic safety statute. The court held that the thir-
teen year old possessed the requisite capacity to be contributorily
negligent, and that the standard of care applicable was the degree
of care ordinarily exercised by a thirteen year old of similar mental
capacity. "' Additionally, the court indicated that it also favored ap-
plying the Massachusetts approach to children between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen. The court made a special effort to point out
that children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen should be
judged according to a children's standard and not an adult standard
of care."' However, nothing was mentioned about the Bottorff treat-
ment of children under age seven.' Although Bixenman explicitly
rejected the Illinois method of categorical treatment of children bet-
ween the ages of seven and fourteen, and implicitly rejected the
categorical treatment of those above age fourteen, it left unaltered
the presumption regarding children below age seven.
165. Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 110 N.E. 977 (1916).
166. Brush v. Public Serv. Co., 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939); Kent v.
Interstate Pub. Serv. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 168 N.E. 465 (1929).
167. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950)(at-
tractive nuisance case discussing Bottorff); see also Indianapolis Ry. v. Williams, 115
Ind. App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586 (1945).
168. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id at 529, 242 N.E.2d at 840.
172. Id
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As a result of Bixenman and other recent decisions,1 3 it can be
concluded that the Illinois approach, except the presumption regard-
ing children below age seven, has either been explicitly or implicitly
rejected. Since Bixenman dealt with a child in the seven to fourteen
age group and only ruled on the treatment of children within that
age group, there is a weak argument that the court's discussion of
those age fourteen to eighteen was only dictum.' Nevertheless, the
Indiana appellate court has found the Bixenman language
persuasive.
In 1975 the appellate court held that a sixteen year old was en-
titled to the special consideration of a child and was not required to
meet an adult standard of reasonableness.' To support its decision,
the court looked to the Indiana Code which fixed age eighteen as
the age of legal majority. 7 ' The court reasoned that since the
legislative treated those under eighteen as minors and not adults,
173. Smith v. Diamond, __ Ind. App. - , 421 N.E.2d 1172 (1981); Petroski
v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Lanoux v. Hager, 159 Ind. App.
646, 308 N.E.2d 873 (1974); Stewart v. Jeffries, 159 Ind. App. 693, 309 N.E.2d 443
(1974); Hobby Shops, Inc. v. Drudy, 161 Ind. App. 699, 317 N.E.2d 473 (1974).
174. The court indicated that it favored treating those between fourteen and
eighteen as children, not as adults. Since the conduct of a thirteen-year-old was under
consideration in Bixenman and not the conduct of fourteen to eighteen-year-olds, it
might be argued that the court's statement about older children is dictum similar to
the dictum in Bottorff. There are considerable differences between the two cases. Bot-
torff dealt with capacity in an arbitrary manner, Bixenman did not. Bottorff attempted
to arbitrarily determine the capacity of children not before the court. See note 81
supra. Bixenman, on the other hand, dealt with the capacity issue in a non-arbitrary
manner. Bixenman stated that when a child is accused of contributory negligence he
will not be found to have an adult's capacity until age eighteen. Instead, he will be con-
sidered to have a child's capacity and be required to exercise the care of a child of like
age, knowledge, judgment, and experience. The Bixenman court had a child before it
and simply stated how a child should be treated when accused of contributory
negligence. Viewed from this perspective, the argument that Bixenman is dictum has
limited support. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968).
175. Moore v. Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech., 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462
(1975).
176. Id The sixteen-year-old was involved in a child's activity. Had he been in-
volved in an adult activity the standard of care might have been different. In dictum
Bixenman indicated that children engaged in adult activity should be judged by an
adult standard of care. In the situation of a sixteen-year-old driving a car, for example,
society has an overriding interest in holding all who operate vehicles to a high stan-
dard of care. It is therefore necessary to assume the sixteen-year-old has the capacity
to meet such a standard. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968). The
Bixenman dictum concerning children involved in adult activities was subsequently af-
firmed in 1979. McNall v. Farmers Ins. Group, - Ind. App. - , 392 N.E.2d 520
(1979).
177. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-67-1 (Supp. 1980).
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the same individuals should not be required to meet an adult stan-
dard of care when charged with contributory negligence."8 Also in
1976, the appellate court expressly overruled two earlier cases to
the extent that they supported the Bottorff requirement that
children, age fourteen and over, be held to an adult standard of
care.
179
The Bottorff presumption that children below age seven are in-
capable of contributory negligence has never specifically been
repudiated by any Indiana court. Other than one recent appellate
court decision that held a five year old incapable of contributory
negligence, there have been no other recent decisions in the state
courts directly dealing with the issue of children below the age of
seven. 8 ' However, there have been two federal court decisions deal-
ing directly with those below age seven. 8'
The Seventh Circuit, interpreting Indiana law, held that the
Bottorff rule, that children under age seven are conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence, is still valid law in
Indiana.'82 The court, in accordance with the rule, held that a six
year old could not be held contributorily negligent despite proof
that the child was of superior intelligence.'83 The court concluded
that the common law presumption still in effect in Indiana concern-
ing those below age seven precluded considering anything but age
as determinative of the child's capacity.8 The court was careful to
distinguish an earlier Seventh Circuit ruling concerning an eight
year old with the proven mental capacity of a five year old.' In the
earlier case, the court held that Indiana law allowed the considera-
tion of factors other than age to determine the capacity of the child,
and that an eight year old with the proven mental capacity of a five
year old could thereby be considered incapable of contributory
178. Moore v. Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech., 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462
(1975).
179. Petroski v. NIPSCO, 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976). Petroski
overruled the following two cases to the extent they appear contra to the Petroski
decision: Brush v. Public Serv. Co., 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939); Kent v. In-
terstate Pub. Serv. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 168 N.E. 465 (1929).
180. Wozniczka v. McKean, 144 Ind. App. 471, 247 N.E.2d 215 (1969).
181. Mann v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Echevarria v. United
States Steel Corp., 392 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968).
182. Mann v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971).
183. I&
184. lId
185. Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968).
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negligence."' In distinguishing this earlier case, the Seventh Circuit
noted that Indiana does allow consideration of factors other than
age to determine capacity if the child in question is above age seven,
but stated that if the child is below age seven the common law pre-
sumption applies and only age can be considered.'87 The federal
courts have recognized that even though Indiana favors a Massachu-
setts approach for children above age seven, the state still uses the
Illinois approach when dealing with children under the age of
seven. 188
The current combination of the Illinois and Massachusetts ap-
proaches, though somewhat confusing, is not completely without
policy justification. Exactly what these policies are is revealed by a
brief review of the special policy orientation of each approach. Even
though it lacks administrative expediency, the Massachusetts ap-
proach is both flexible and accommodating and is based on sound
policy grounds."8' The special standard of care the court develops for
each child takes time to administer but it insures that the child has
a fair opportunity to be compensated for his injuries."' Likewise, it
insures that the defendant is not allowed to take unfair advantage of
the child and arguably encourages the defendant to be more careful
in the future."' Moreover the child is still expected to act reasonably
for his capacity and is not allowed to unfairly escape responsibility
for unreasonable self-harming conduct."2 The Illinois approach, on
the other hand, is quick and easy to administer, although it is
somewhat arbitrary."' Age is determinative and the other indicators
of a child's capacity are ignored. The older child is not given ade-
quate consideration, while the very young child is given so much
special consideration that the defendant is powerless against him.
However, the Illinois approach is administratively expedient. While
186. Id.
187. Mann. v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971).
188. Id.
189. See generally notes 148-52 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the expediency of the Massachusetts method.
190. See generally notes 153-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the way the Massachusetts approach satisfies the policy of compensation.
191. See generally note 158 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Massachusetts method and the policy of deterrence.
192. See generally note 159 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Massachusetts approach and the policy underlying the contributory negligence
defense.
193. See generally notes 85-98 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the expediency and arbitrariness of the Illinois approach.
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the price of expediency may be high, it can be argued that Indiana
is justified at least in retaining the conclusive presumption that
children below age seven are incapable of contributory negligence. 9
Those in favor of complete abandonment, however, would argue
that it is unfair to completely deny the defendant an opportunity to
use the defense against children below age seven.19 Though a child
below age seven may not have the capacity of an adult, they would
argue that he may be capable of recognizing and avoiding obvious
dangers, such as a fire or a moving vehicle. Accordingly, such a child
should be held responsible for unreasonable conduct in connection
with such dangers if those dangers are proven not to be beyond his
individual capacity to understand.199
Those in favor of retaining the presumptions, on the other
hand, would argue that in most situations a child under age seven
can usually be considered incapable of recognizing and avoiding
most dangers.197 Furthermore, they would argue that since most peo-
ple would agree that the majority of children below age seven do not
have the capacity to deal with the world in a responsible manner, it
would be better to retain the presumption than waste valuable court
time attempting to use proof other than age to show mental
capacities of children below age seven. 9 Though the arugments on
both sides have merit, Indiana presently retains the administrative
expediency of the conclusive presumption that children below age
seven are incapable of contributory negligence.
While Indiana has retained some of the administrative expe-
diency of the Illinois method, most of the arbitrariness of the ap-
proach has either been completely abandoned or has been mitigated
by incorporating the more accomodating Massachusetts approach.
The arbitrary division between those below fourteen, once pre-
sumed rebuttably incapable of contributory negligence, and those
above age fourteen, once considered capable of bearing the respon-
sibility for their unreasonable conduct as adults, no longer exists in
Indiana.'99 Rather than treat a child as a child one day and then as
194. Wilderman, supra note 94.
195. Hellstem v. Smelowitz, 17 N.J. Super. 366, 86 A.2d 271 (1952).
196. See generally Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 603 (1961).
197. See generally Chicago City R. Co. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997
(1902); Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126 S.W.2d 448 (1939).
198. See generally Chicago City R. Co. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997
(1902).
199. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Moore v. Rose-
Hulman Inst. of Tech., 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462 (1975).
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an adult the day after he turns fourteen, the Indiana courts now
develop a special standard of care for each child that corresponds to
the child's mental capacity, not just his age. As the mental
capacities of a child increase from age seven to age eighteen, the
standard of care developed by the court becomes progressively
closer to that of an adult's. °0 Thus, in the final transition from the
most demanding child standard to an adult standard at age eighteen,
the difference in standards of care will be hardly noticeable.
Similarly the transition from the point where a child is pre-
sumed incapable of contributory negligence at age six, to the point
where he may be proved capable of contributory negligence at age
seven, will hardly be discernible under the current Illinois-
Massachusetts combination. °' Of those children between age seven
and eighteen found to possess the requisite capacity to be con-
tributorily negligent, the youngest children with the lowest mental
capacity will be judged according to the least demanding standard of
care. The standard developed for and applied to a normal nine year
old will be stricter than the standard applied to an eight year old.
The younger the child the less demanding the standard. 2 Therefore,
the transition will be smooth from the period of life where the child
is presumed incapable of contributory negligence to the period when
the child is progressively held more and more responsible for his
conduct as his mental capacity increases.
While the combination of the Massachusetts and Illinois ap-
proaches currently used in Indiana satisfies most of the major policy
concerns, the transition to using the Massachusetts approach is not yet
completed. If the current approach remains unchanged, neither child
plaintiff nor adult defendant would suffer any great prejudice. It is
doubtful, however, that this area of the law will remain unaltered for
long. Furthermore, the current approach, though satisfying most
policy considerations, could still be approved.
IV. ANTICIPATED MODIFICATIONS OF THE CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE AS APPLIED TO CHILDREN
The combination of the Massachusetts and Illinois approaches
200. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Moore v. Rose-
Hulman Inst. of Tech., 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462 (1975).
201. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); LaNoux v. Hagar,
159 Ind. App. 646, 308 N.E.2d 873 (1974); Stewart v. Jeffries, 159 Ind. App. 693, 309
N.E.2d 443 (1974).
202. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Stewart v. Jeffries,
159 Ind. App. 693, 309 N.E.2d 443 (1974).
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currently used in Indiana, though basically consistent with legal
policy, is still susceptable to improvement. There are two aspects of
the current law which could be revised to make the defense more
equitable for both plaintiff and defendant. First, the courts could
abandon the presumption concerning children below age seven and
extend the Massachusetts approach to include children of all ages. °3
Second, the courts or legislature could formally adopt a procedure to
apportion the cost of the injury according to the relative contribu-
tion of each party."0 '
Extendng the Massachusetts approach to cover children below
age seven would give the defendant a better opportunity to show
that the child plaintiff is capable of bearing the responsibility for
unreasonable contribution to his own injuries. Though most young
children may not have the capacity to recognize and deal with all
dangers, many children below age seven may be able to recognize
and understand certain dangers.0 5 A typical example would be the
dangers inherent in a body of water. Many, but not all children, are
capable of recognizing these dangers.0 6 Accordingly, it would be fair
to allow the defendant to prove that the child's unreasonable con-
duct toward such comprehensible dangers contributed to his injury.
Under current Indiana law, the defendant would not be allowed
to offer such proof. However, if the Massachusetts approach was ex-
tended to include children below age seven, the defendant would
have the opportunity to prove that such a child contributed to his
own harm. Alternatively, the conclusive presumption of incapacity
could be reduced to a rebuttable presumption. Children below age
seven, though presumed incapable of contributory negligence, could
be found contributorily negligent if they were proven to possess suf-
ficient capacity to appreciate the particular danger. The only dif-
ference between this alternative and an extension the Mass-
achusetts approach would be the language. The mechanics would not
differ. Thus, the simplest way of eliminating the inequity of pro-
hibiting the defendant from using the defense against children
below age seven, would be to extend the coverage of the
203. See notes 195-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pros and
cons of eliminating the presumption regarding children below age seven.
204. See notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of why a
refusal to consider whether a child is contributorily negligent contravenes the purpose
of the defense. See also Lowndes, supra note 42; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-45.
205. Harness v. Church Members Life Ins. Co., 241 Ind. 672, 175 N.E.2d 132
(1961)(six-year-old capable of understanding the danger of water).
206. Id.
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Massachusetts approach to include children below age seven as well
as those above age seven.
Beyond extending the coverage of the Massachusetts approach,
another modification that might make Indiana law more equitable,
would be the adoption of a procedure to apportion the cost of the
injury according to the relative contribution of each party.0 7 Though
Indiana has consistently rejected the formal adoption of comparative
negligence,2"8 the current Indiana approach to the children's con-
tributory negligence problem is in essense a limited form of com-
parative negligence. The current approach to the contributory
negligence of children above age seven is to weigh the relative
responsibilities of each party according to the relative capabilities of
each, yet ultimately the cost of the injury for which both parties are
partly responsible is placed on only one party.0 9 While considerable
effort is expended comparing responsibility, attempts to apportion
damages are refused. A comparative negligence approach would
apportion the damages between the parties according to each
party's responsibility for the injury. 1 A formal change to com-
parative negligence would have a positive effect on the area of
children's contributory negligence. A child, only partly responsible
for his injury, would bear part but not all of the burden of the
injury. Viewed another way, a defendant found partly to blame for a
child's injury would not be able to completely escape responsibility
for the injury simply because the child also acted unreasonably."'
Apportionment of the costs of a child's injury according to the
relative responsibilities of each party has worked well in other
states and it would work in Indiana.2"2 Though the Indiana courts
have been reluctant to change to comparative negligence, and
probably will not do so in the near future,2"2 such a change would be
a logical step toward fulfilling the policy goals the state already en-
207. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-45.
208. Booher v. Alhom, Inc., 156 Ind. App. 192, 295 N.E.2d 841 (1973).
209. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 443-45.
210. Id.
211. A situation appropriate for the application of comparative negligence is
the fact situation in Harden v. U.S., 485 F. Supp. 380 (D.C. Ga. 1980). The case in-
volved a fifteen-year-old who was shot by a park ranger. The fifteen-year-old was shot
while participating in a fraternity hazing at a wilderness park. The boy was negligent,
but the park ranger that shot him was also negligent. The court applied Georgia's com-
parative negligence law and apportioned the damages between the parties.
212. Id.
213. Booher v. Alhom, Inc., 156 Ind. App. 192, 295 N.E.2d 841 (1973).
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dorses. Furthermore, comparative negligence principles could be
used experimentally when dealing with children before such prin-
ciples were applied in cases involving only adults. One can only
speculate on whether Indiana will eventually adopt comparative
negligence or will even extend the Massachusetts approach to in-
clude children of all ages. Nevertheless, both changes would be con-
sistent with current trends.
CONCLUSION
Historically there has been considerable disagreement over the
appropriate approach to the children's contributory negligence
problem. The current Indiana combination of the Massachusetts and
Illinois approaches, to a limited extent, successfully incorporates the
best aspects of both methods. Though much of the administrative
simplicity of the Illinois approach was abandoned, the most
justifiable portion that dealt with children below age seven was re-
tained.' However, most of the arbitrariness of the Illinois approach
has given way to the more flexible and accomodating Massachusetts
approach. In Indiana no child below age eighteen is unfairly
penalized by the contributory negligence defense. Children below
age seven are granted the ultimate in special consideration since the
defendant is completely prohibited from using the defense against
them. 1 5 Similarly, those between age seven and eighteen are given
special consideration, though the defense can be used against
them."6 In every case where a child is between the ages of seven
and eighteen, the individual child's capacity to be contributorily
negligent is evaluated. Then, the reasonableness of the child's con-
duct is determined according to an individualized and subjective
standard of care.' Under current Indiana law all children are given
a fair opportunity to recover compensation for their injuries. In
most cases where children are above age seven, the defendant is
given a fair chance to use the defense to prove that the plaintiff
214. Only the federal courts have ruled on whether Indiana has retained the
presumption regarding those below age seven, Indiana courts have not specifically
dealt with the issue. Mann v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit's argument seems logical, accurate, and persuasive.
215. Id.
216. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Stewart v. Jeffries,
159 Ind. App. 693, 309 N.E.2d 443 (1974).
217. Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Moore v. Rose-
Hulman Inst. of Tech. 165 Ind. App. 165, 331 N.E.2d 462 (1975); LaNoux v. Hagar, 159
Ind. App. 646, 308 N.E.2d 873 (1974); Stewart v. Jeffries, 159 Ind. App. 693, 309 N.E.2d
443 (1974).
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should bear the greater responsibility for the injury.218 Though the
combination of the Massachusetts and Illinois approaches that
Indiana now utilizes satisfies most major policy concerns, the transi-
tion to a total adoption of the Massachusetts approach is not yet
complete. If the Indiana courts wish to complete that transition
some changes must still be made. In addition to a complete adoption
of the Massachusetts approach, the adoption of comparative
negligence principles would also be consistent with the policies
underlying the approach Indiana now utilizes. It appears that such
changes will eventually be made, but one can only speculate as to
when.
David W. Holub
218. The only situation where a child above age seven could not be proven con-
tributorily negligent would be if the child's mental capacity was below that of a seven-
year-old. Echevarria v. U.S. Steel Corp., 393 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1968). Since a federal
decision is not binding on the Indiana courts, Echevarria may only be persuasive
authority in an action brought in state court.
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